TREASURY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY STATEMENT AND ANNUAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY 2020/21 TO 2022/23

REPORT OF:	Head of Corporate Resources
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Wards Affected:	All
Key Decision:	No
Report to:	Audit Committee, 3 March 2020

Purpose of Report

1. This report sets out the Council's investment and borrowing strategy for the forthcoming three years and reports the counterparty list with which investments may be made. It also sets out the Prudential Limits that provide the parameters for approved future lending and borrowing, including the incidental cost of so doing.

Summary

2. The purchase of the Orchard Shopping Centre head lease in November 2016 necessitated borrowing of £22m from other Local Authorities. £15m has already been repaid, using the cash flow generated by matured fixed term deposits. £2m will be repaid in November 2020 and the final £5m in November 2021.

3. Lending is restricted to the same counterparties and within the same limits as in the previous strategy approved in March 2019 except for the following amendments:

4. Halifax and HBOS have been removed as they are no longer on the suggested credit list supplied by Link Asset Services.

5. The limit for investment in the Local Authorities' Property Fund has been amended from "the higher of £4m or 25% of funds" to "the higher of £6m or 25% of funds" to accommodate the current investment of £6m. Investments in property funds are less liquid than cash investments and it would not be appropriate to withdraw funds in order to meet the 25% limit if, for example, liquid investments were used for a significant property purchase, resulting in a breach of the 25% limit.

6. The Council will give consideration to the use of "green" and "ethical" investments where appropriate.

Recommendations

7. The Committee is recommended to propose that Council agree:

- **(i) the proposed Treasury Management Strategy Statement (TMSS) for 2020/21 and the following two years,**
- **(ii) the Annual Investment Strategy (AIS) and the Minimum Revenue Provision Statement (MRP) as contained in Sections 4 and 2.3 respectively of the report;**
- **(iii) the Prudential Indicators contained within this report.**

Background

8. The Council applies and upholds the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy's Code of Practice for Treasury Management in Public Services (the "CIPFA TM Code"). CIPFA has defined Treasury Management as:

   "the management of the organisation's borrowing, investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks."

9. The Code requires local authorities to produce an annual Treasury Management Strategy Statement (TMSS), which documents the Council's approach to capital financing and investments for the forthcoming financial year (2020/21) and the following two years. This report fulfils that requirement.

10. In producing the TMSS, The Local Government Act 2003 (the Act) and supporting regulations require the Council to 'have regard to' the CIPFA Prudential Code and the CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice to set Prudential and Treasury Indicators for the next three years. The indicators are established to ensure that the Council's capital investment plans are affordable, prudent and sustainable.

11. Additionally, the Act and its subsequent Investment Guidance require the Council to set out its treasury management strategy for borrowing, and to prepare an Annual Investment Strategy (AIS). The Council's borrowing position is reported in Section 3, with arrangements for making Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) for repayment of debt explained in Section 2.3. The AIS is contained in Section 4 of this report, and describes the Council's policies for managing its investments, and for giving priority to the security and liquidity of those investments.

12. Statute requires that the AIS, MRP Statement, and Prudential Indicators are approved by full Council before the start of the new financial year.

Policy Context

13. Providing transparency and approval of the strategies contained in this report is an important part of the Council's statutory role. Treasury Management has become increasingly topical given the nature of the world's financial markets in recent years, and Members are expected to have a basic understanding of how the Council uses its reserves and cash flows which are in the stewardship of the Head of Corporate Resources.

Other Options Considered

14. None – this report is statutorily required.

Financial Implications

15. This report has no quantifiable financial implications. Interest payable and interest receivable arising from treasury management operations, and annual revenue provisions for repayment of debt, form part of the revenue budget but are not required to support the provision of services.

Risk Management Implications

16. This report has no specific implications for the risk profile of the Authority.

Equality and Customer Service Implications

17. None.

Background Papers

Treasury Management Strategy Statement & Annual Investment Strategy 2019/20 to 2021/22 (March 2019)

Annual Review of Treasury Management 2018-19 (July 2019)

Review of Treasury Management Activity 1 April – 30 September 2019 (Nov. 2019)

Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes (CIPFA)

The Prudential Code for Capital Finance in Local Authorities (CIPFA, December 2017)

MHCLG Investment Guidance (Revised for April 2018) and MRP Guidance

Link Asset Services report template (January 2020)

Treasury Management Strategy Statement & Annual Investment 2020/21 to 2022/23

INTRODUCTION

Background

1. The Council is required to operate a balanced budget, which broadly means that cash raised during the year will meet cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the Council's low risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return.

2. The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer term cash flow planning, to ensure that the Council can meet its capital spending obligations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses. On occasion, when it is prudent and economic, any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.

3. The contribution the treasury management function makes to the authority is critical, as the balance of debt and investment operations ensure liquidity or the ability to meet spending commitments as they fall due, either on day-to-day revenue or for larger capital projects. The treasury operations will see a balance of the interest costs of debt and the investment income arising from cash deposits affecting the available budget. Since cash balances generally result from reserves and balances, it is paramount to ensure adequate security of the sums invested, as a loss of principal will in effect result in a loss to the General Fund Balance.

4. Whilst any commercial initiatives or loans to third parties will impact on the treasury function, these activities are generally classed as non-treasury activities, (arising usually from capital expenditure),and are separate from the day to day treasury management activities.

Reporting requirements

<u>Capital Strategy</u>

5. The CIPFA revised 2017 Prudential and Treasury Management Codes require all local authorities to prepare a capital strategy report which will provide the following:

   - a high-level long term overview of how capital expenditure, capital financing and treasury management activity contribute to the provision of services
   - an overview of how the associated risk is managed
   - the implications for future financial sustainability

6. The aim of this capital strategy is to ensure that all elected members on the full council fully understand the overall long-term policy objectives and resulting capital strategy requirements, governance procedures and risk appetite.

Treasury Management reporting

7. The Council is required to receive and approve, as a minimum, three main reports each year, which incorporate a variety of policies, estimates and actuals:

(a) **Prudential and treasury indicators and treasury strategy (this report) - the first, and most important report covers:**

   - the capital plans (including prudential indicators);

- a minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy (how residual capital expenditure is charged to revenue over time);
- the treasury management strategy (how the investments and borrowings are to be organised) including treasury indicators; and
- an investment strategy (the parameters on how investments are to be managed).

The approval of the Treasury Management Strategy and Annual Investment Strategy is the function of the Council, however the Head of Corporate Resources shall also report to the Audit Committee on treasury management activity performance as follows:

(b) **A mid year treasury management report** – This will update Members with the progress of the capital position, amending prudential indicators as necessary, and whether any policies require revision. The report will be submitted as soon after 30 September as practically possible.

(c) **An annual treasury report** – This provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimates within the strategy. The report will be submitted no later than 30 September after the financial year end.

8. **Scrutiny** - The above reports are required to be adequately scrutinised before being recommended to the Council. This role is undertaken by the Audit Committee, which may make recommendations regarding any aspects of treasury management policy and practices it considers appropriate in fulfilment of its scrutiny role. Such recommendations, as may be made shall be incorporated within the above named reports and submitted to meetings of the Council for consideration at the next available opportunity.

9. The Council's Scheme of Delegations is set out in Appendix E.

Treasury Management Strategy for 2020/21

10. The strategy for 2020/21 covers two main areas:

(a) Capital issues
- the capital expenditure plans and the associated prudential indicators;
- the minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy.

(b) Treasury management issues
- the current treasury position;
- treasury indicators which limit the treasury risk and activities of the Council;
- prospects for interest rates;
- the borrowing strategy;
- policy on borrowing in advance of need;
- debt rescheduling;
- the investment strategy;
- creditworthiness policy; and
- policy on use of external service providers.

11. These elements cover the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003, the CIPFA Prudential Code, MHCLG MRP Guidance, the CIPFA Treasury Management Code and MHCLG Investment Guidance.

Training

12. The CIPFA Code requires the responsible officer to ensure that Members with responsibility for treasury management receive adequate training. This especially applies to Members responsible for scrutiny. Training was supplied by Link Asset Services on the 2nd July 2019 and during 2020/21 appropriate mandatory treasury management training will be provided to the Audit Committee. The training needs of the treasury management officers at Adur District Council, who provide the shared treasury service to Mid Sussex District Council, are periodically reviewed. Officers attend courses provided by appropriate trainers such as CIPFA and Link Asset Services.

External Service Providers

13. The Council obtains treasury management services under a Shared Services Arrangement (SSA) from the in-house treasury management team formed out of the partnership working between Adur District and Worthing Borough Councils. The operation for all three Councils' treasury management is based at Worthing Town Hall, utilising similar banking arrangements. The SSA is provided under a Service Level Agreement (SLA) that commenced in October 2019 and which defines the respective roles of the client and provider authorities for a period of three years.

14. The SSA uses Link Asset Services as its external treasury management advisors. The Council recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources.

15. In making this arrangement the Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that reliance beyond the terms and arrangements specified in the SLA is not placed upon the shared service providers. The Council will ensure that the terms of the appointment of the shared services providers, and the methods by which their value will be assessed, are properly agreed and documented and subjected to regular review.

THE CAPITAL PRUDENTIAL INDICATORS 2020/21 – 2022/23

16. The Council's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The output of the capital expenditure plans is reflected in the Prudential Indicators, which are designed to assist Members' overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

Capital expenditure

17. This Prudential Indicator is a summary of the Council's capital expenditure plans, both those agreed previously, and those forming part of this budget cycle. The figures exclude other long term liabilities, such as leasing arrangements which already include borrowing instruments. Members are asked to approve the capital expenditure forecasts:

Capital expenditure £m	2018/19 Actual	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate
General Fund	24.626	6.253	2.232	1.989	0.161

18. The table below summarises the above capital expenditure plans and how these plans are being financed by capital or revenue resources. Any shortfall of resources results in a funding borrowing need.

Financing of capital expenditure £m	2018/19 Actual	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate
Capital receipts	1.269	0.058	10.472	10.050	10.050
Capital grants, Contributions & S106 receipts	4.827	2.307	1.512	1.583	0.000
General Reserves, Specific Reserves & Revenue Contributions	15.939	3.888	0.248	0.356	0.111
Net financing need for the year	2.591	0.000	(10.000)	(10.000)	(10.000)

The Council's borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement)

19. The second prudential indicator is the Council's Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). The CFR is simply the total historic outstanding capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resources. It is essentially a measure of the Council's indebtedness and so its underlying borrowing need. Any capital expenditure above, which has not immediately been paid for through a revenue or capital resource, will increase the CFR. The CFR does not increase indefinitely, as the minimum revenue provision (MRP) is a statutory annual revenue charge which broadly reduces the indebtedness in line with each asset's life and so charges the economic consumption of capital assets as they are used.

20. The CFR includes any other long term liabilities (e.g. finance leases). Whilst these increase the CFR, and therefore the Council's borrowing requirement, these types of scheme include a borrowing facility and so the Council is not required to separately borrow for these schemes. The Council currently has one finance lease taken out in 2018 and ending in 2028.

21. The Council is asked to approve the CFR projections below:

Capital Financing Requirement £m	2018/19 Actual	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate
Total CFR at 31/03	27.948	27.438	16.916	6.382	(4.615)
Movement in CFR	2.591	(0.510)	(10.522)	(10.534)	(10.547)
Movement in CFR represented by:					
Net financing need for the year (above)	3.089	0.000	(10.000)	(10.000)	(10.000)
Less MRP and other financing movements	(0.498)	(0.510)	(0.522)	(0.534)	(0.547)
Movement in CFR	2.591	(0.510)	(10.522)	(10.534)	(10.547)

Minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy statement

22. The Council is required to pay off an element of the accumulated General Fund capital spend each year (the CFR) through a revenue charge (the minimum revenue provision - MRP), although it is also allowed to undertake additional voluntary payments if required (voluntary revenue provision - VRP).

23. MHCLG regulations have been issued which require the full Council to approve an MRP Statement in advance of each year. A variety of options is provided to councils, so long as there is a prudent provision. The Council is recommended to approve the following MRP Statement*:*

24. The Council's policy for MRP relating to unfunded capital expenditure is to provide for MRP on an annuity basis over the life of the loans (except as detailed below for the Orchard Shopping Centre). As an annuity is a fixed annual sum comprising interest and principal, the MRP for repayment of debt will increase each year over the asset life as the proportion of interest calculated on the principal outstanding reduces as the debt is repaid.

25. The purchase of the Orchard Shopping Centre head lease in November 2016 increased the Capital Financing Requirement. However, as the Council is forecasting possible capital receipts of over £30m, MRP will only be provided on the balance of nearly £5m. This will be done on a level basis of £100,000 per year.

26. Repayments included in finance leases are applied as MRP.

BORROWING

27. The capital expenditure plans set out in Section 2 provide details of the service activity of the Council. The treasury management function ensures that the Council's cash is organised in accordance with the the relevant professional codes, so that sufficient cash is available to meet the service activity and the Council's capital strategy. This will involve both the organisation of the cash flow and, where capital plans require, the organisation of appropriate borrowing facilities. The strategy covers the relevant treasury / prudential indicators, the current and projected debt positions and the annual investment strategy.

Current portfolio position

28. The overall treasury management portfolio as at 31 March 2019 and for the position as at 31 December 2019 are shown below for both borrowing and investments.

	Principal at 31.03.19 £m	Actual 31.03.2019 %	Principal at 31.12.19 £m	Actual 31.12.2019 %
External Borrowing				
PWLB	(0.571)	4%	(0.505)	5%
Other Borrowing	(13.000)	79%	(7.000)	69%
Finance lease	(2.818)	17%	(2.610)	26%
TOTAL BORROWING	**(16.389)**	100%	**(10.115)**	100%
Treasury Investments:				
Local Authority Property Fund	5.942	19%	5.942	13%
In-house:				
Banks	6.010	19%	7.001	16%
Building societies - unrated	9.000	29%	17.000	38%
Building societies - rated	4.000	13%	7.000	16%
Local authorities	1.000	3%	0.000	0%
Money market funds	5.200	17%	7.735	17%
TOTAL INVESTMENTS	**31.152**	100%	**44.678**	100%
NET INVESTMENTS	**14.763**		**34.563**	

29. The Council's forward projections for borrowing are summarised below. The table shows the actual external debt, against the underlying capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement - CFR), highlighting any over or under borrowing.

External Debt £m	2018/19 Actual	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate
Debt at 1 April	12.698	13.571	7.437	5.298	0.152
Expected change in Debt	0.873	(6.134)	(2.139)	(5.146)	(0.152)
Other long-term liabilities (OLTL)	0.000	2.818	2.541	2.258	1.970
Expected change in OLTL	2.818	(0.277)	(0.283)	(0.288)	(0.294)
Actual gross debt at 31 March	16.389	9.978	7.556	2.122	1.676
The Capital Financing Requirement	27.948	27.438	16.916	6.382	(4.615)
Under/(over) borrowing	11.559	17.460	9.360	4.260	(1.676)

30. The Council's debt comprises one loan from the Public Works Loan Board (PWLB), which matures on 1 March 2023 and 2 loans with other local authorities, totalling £7m, which mature in November 2020 (£2m) and November 2021 (£5m), which were arranged to fund the purchase of the Orchard Shopping Centre head lease. The local authority loans are at rates lower than those that were available from the PWLB, ranging from 1.0% to 1.1% (average rate), and they will be repaid using capital receipts and maturing investments. The "other long term liability" is in respect of capital assets acquired by finance leases.

31. Within the range of Prudential Indicators there are a number of key indicators to ensure that the Council operates its activities within well-defined limits. One of these is that the Council needs to ensure that its gross debt does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2020/21 and the following two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years, but ensures that borrowing is not undertaken for revenue or speculative purposes.

32. The Head of Corporate Resources reports that the Council complied with this Prudential Indicator in the current year. The respective timings of capital receipts and repayment of debt result in a projected over borrowing position in 2022/23. However this is due to the Council's ability to fund its capital expenditure from grants and other resources and is not an indication of imprudent borrowing. In addition, both the CFR and the outstanding debt are small relative to the size of the Council's budget. This view takes into account current commitments, existing plans, and the proposals in this report.

Treasury Indicators: limits to borrowing activity

33. **The operational boundary** - This is the limit which external debt is not normally expected to exceed. In most cases, this would be a similar figure to the CFR, but may be lower or higher depending on the levels of actual debt and the ability to fund under-borrowing by other cash resources.

Operational Boundary	2019/20	2020/21	2021/22	2022/23
	£m	**£m**	**£m**	**£m**
Debt	£28.0m	£28.0m	£28.0m	£28.0m
Other long term liabilities	£4.0m	£4.0m	£4.0m	£4.0m
Total	**£32.0m**	**£32.0m**	**£32.0m**	**£32.0m**

34. **The authorised limit for external debt** – This is a key Prudential Indicator and represents a control on the maximum level of borrowing. This represents a legal limit beyond which external debt is prohibited, and this limit needs to be set or revised by the full Council. It reflects the level of external debt which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term.

(i) The Council is asked to approve the authorised limit:

Authorised Limit	2019/20	2020/21	2021/22	2022/23
	£m	**£m**	**£m**	**£m**
Debt	£30.0m	£30.0m	£30.0m	£30.0m
Other long term liabilities	£4.0m	£4.0m	£4.0m	£4.0m
Total	**£34.0m**	**£34.0m**	**£34.0m**	**£34.0m**

(ii) This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003. The Government retains an option to control either the total of all councils' plans, or those of a specific council, although this power has not yet been exercised.

35. The Head of Corporate Resources has delegated authority, within the total limit for any individual year, to effect movement between the separately agreed limits for borrowing and other long term liabilities. Decisions will be based on the outcome of financial option appraisals and best value considerations. Any movement between these separate limits will be reported to the next meeting of the Council at the earliest opportunity.

Prospects for interest rates and the economy

36. This section contains a commentary for the economic outlook provided by the Council's shared service provider's treasury management consultants, Link Asset Services . This includes a central view of forecast interest rates as follows:

Link Asset Services Interest Rate View	Dec-19	Mar-20	Jun-20	Sep-20	Dec-20	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23
Bank Rate View	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25
3 Month LIBID	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.10	1.20	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30
6 Month LIBID	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.10	1.10	1.20	1.30	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50
12 Month LIBID	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.10	1.20	1.30	1.30	1.40	1.50	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70
5yr PWLB Rate	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50	2.60	2.70	2.80	2.90	2.90	3.00	3.10	3.20	3.20
10yr PWLB Rate	2.60	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.80	2.90	3.00	3.10	3.20	3.20	3.30	3.30	3.40	3.50
25yr PWLB Rate	3.20	3.30	3.40	3.40	3.50	3.60	3.70	3.70	3.80	3.90	4.00	4.00	4.10	4.10
50yr PWLB Rate	3.10	3.20	3.30	3.30	3.40	3.50	3.60	3.60	3.70	3.80	3.90	3.90	4.00	4.00

37. The above forecasts have been based on an assumption that there is an agreed deal on Brexit, including agreement on the terms of trade between the UK and EU, at some point in time. The result of the general election has removed much uncertainty around this major assumption. However, it does not remove uncertainty around whether agreement can be reached with the EU on a trade deal within the short time to December 2020, as the prime minister has pledged.

38. It has been little surprise that the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) left Bank Rate unchanged at 0.75% so far due to the ongoing uncertainty over Brexit and the outcome of the general election. In its meeting on 7 November, the MPC became more dovish due to increased concerns over the outlook for the domestic economy if Brexit uncertainties were to become more entrenched, and for weak global economic growth: if those uncertainties were to materialise, then the MPC were likely to cut Bank Rate. However, if they were both to dissipate, then rates would need to rise at a "gradual pace and to a limited extent". Brexit uncertainty has had a dampening effect on UK GDP growth in 2019, especially around mid-year. There is still some residual risk that the MPC could cut Bank Rate as the UK economy is still likely to only grow weakly in 2020 due to continuing uncertainty over whether there could effectively be a no deal Brexit in December 2020 if agreement on a trade deal is not reached with the EU. Until that major uncertainty is removed, or the period for agreeing a deal is extended, it is unlikely that the MPC would raise Bank Rate.

39. **Bond yields / PWLB rates** There has been much speculation during 2019 that the bond market has gone into a bubble, as evidenced by high bond prices and remarkably low yields. However, given the context that there have been heightened expectations that the US was heading for a recession in 2020, and a general background of a downturn in world economic growth, together with inflation generally at low levels in most countries and expected to remain subdued, conditions are ripe for low bond yields. While inflation targeting by the major central banks has been successful over the last thirty years in lowering inflation expectations, the real equilibrium rate for central rates has fallen considerably due to the high level of borrowing by consumers: this means that central banks do not need to raise rates as much now to have a major impact on consumer spending, inflation, etc. This has pulled down the overall level of interest rates and bond yields in financial markets over the last thirty years. We have therefore seen over the last year, many bond yields up to ten years in the Eurozone actually turn negative. In addition, there has, at times, been an inversion of bond yields in the US whereby ten-year yields have fallen below shorter-term yields. In the past, this has been a precursor of a recession. The other side of this coin is that bond prices are elevated, as investors would be expected to be moving out of riskier assets i.e. shares, in anticipation of a downturn in corporate earnings and so selling out of equities. However, stock markets are also currently at high levels as some investors have focused on chasing returns in the context of dismal ultra-low interest rates on cash deposits.

40. During the first half of 2019-20 to 30 September, gilt yields plunged and caused a near halving of longer term PWLB rates to completely unprecedented historic low levels. (See paragraph 3.7 for comments on the increase in the PWLB rates margin over gilt yields of 100bps introduced on 9 October 2019.) There is though, an expectation that financial markets have gone too far in their fears about the degree of the downturn in US and world growth. If, as expected, the US only suffers a mild downturn in growth, bond markets in the US are likely to sell off and that would be expected to put upward pressure on bond yields, not only in the US, but also in the UK due to a correlation between US treasuries and UK gilts; at various times this correlation has been strong but at other times weak. However, forecasting the timing of this, and how strong the correlation is likely to be, is very difficult to forecast with any degree of confidence. Changes in UK Bank Rate will also impact on gilt yields.

41. One potential danger that may be lurking in investor minds is that Japan has become mired in a twenty-year bog of failing to get economic growth and inflation up off the floor, despite a combination of massive monetary and fiscal stimulus by both the central bank and government. Investors could be fretting that this condition might become contagious to other western economies.

42. Another danger is that unconventional monetary policy post 2008, (ultra-low interest rates plus quantitative easing), may end up doing more harm than good through prolonged use. Low interest rates have encouraged a debt-fuelled boom that now makes it harder for central banks to raise interest rates. Negative interest rates could damage the profitability of commercial banks and so impair their ability to lend and / or push them into riskier lending. Banks could also end up holding large amounts of their government's bonds and so create a potential doom loop. (A doom loop would occur where the credit rating of the debt of a nation was downgraded which would cause bond prices to fall, causing losses on debt portfolios held by banks and insurers, so reducing their capital and forcing them to sell bonds – which, in turn, would cause further falls in their prices etc.). In addition, the financial viability of pension funds could be damaged by low yields on holdings of bonds.

43. The overall longer run future trend is for gilt yields, and consequently PWLB rates, to rise, albeit gently. From time to time, gilt yields, and therefore PWLB rates, can be subject to exceptional levels of volatility due to geo-political, sovereign debt crisis, emerging market developments and sharp changes in investor sentiment. Such volatility could occur at any time during the forecast period.

44. In addition, PWLB rates are subject to ad hoc decisions by H.M. Treasury to change the margin over gilt yields charged in PWLB rates: such changes could be up or down. It is not clear that if gilt yields were to rise back up again by over 100bps within the next year or so, whether H M Treasury would remove the extra 100 bps margin implemented on 9 October 2019.

45. Economic and interest rate forecasting remains difficult with so many influences weighing on UK gilt yields and PWLB rates. The above forecasts, (and MPC decisions), will be liable to further amendment depending on how economic data and developments in financial markets transpire over the next year. Geopolitical developments, especially in the EU, could also have a major impact. Forecasts for average investment earnings beyond the three-year time horizon will be heavily dependent on economic and political developments.

Investment and borrowing rates

46. Investment returns are likely to remain low during 2020/21 with little increase in the following two years. However, if major progress was made with an agreed Brexit, then there is upside potential for earnings.

47. Borrowing interest rates were on a major falling trend during the first half of 2019-20 but then jumped up by 100 bps on 9 October 2019. The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances has served local authorities well over the last few years. However, the unexpected increase of 100 bps in PWLB rates requires a major rethink of local authority treasury management strategy and risk management. Now that the gap between longer term borrowing rates and investment rates has materially widened, and in the long term Bank Rate is not expected to rise above 2.5%, it is unlikely that this authority will do any further longer term borrowing for the next three years, or until such time as the extra 100 bps margin is removed

48. If this authority is not able to avoid borrowing to finance new capital expenditure, there will be a cost of carry, (the difference between higher borrowing costs and lower investment returns), to any new short or medium-term borrowing that causes a temporary increase in cash balances as this position will, most likely, incur a revenue cost.

Borrowing strategy

49. The Council is currently maintaining an under-borrowed position. This means that the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement), has not been fully funded with loan debt as cash supporting the Council's reserves, balances and cash flow has been used as a temporary measure. This strategy is prudent as investment returns are low and counterparty risk is still an issue that needs to be considered.

50. Against this background and the risks within the economic forecast, caution will be adopted with the 2020/21 treasury operations. The Head of Corporate Resources will monitor interest rates in financial markets and adopt a pragmatic approach to changing circumstances:

    (i) if it was felt that there is a significant risk of a sharp FALL in borrowing rates, (e.g. due to a marked increase of risks around relapse into recession or of risks of deflation), then borrowing will be postponed.

    (ii) if it was felt that there is a significant risk of a much sharper RISE in borrowing rates than that currently forecast, perhaps arising from an acceleration in the rate of increase in central rates in the USA and UK, an increase in world economic activity, or a sudden increase in inflation risks, then the portfolio position will be re-appraised. Most likely, fixed rate funding will be drawn whilst interest rates are lower than they are projected to be in the next few years.

    Any decisions will be reported to the appropriate decision making body at the next available opportunity.

Policy on borrowing in advance of need

51. The Council will not borrow more than or in advance of its needs purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates, and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the Council can ensure the security of such funds. Risks associated with any borrowing in advance activity will be subject to prior appraisal and subsequent reporting through the mid-year or annual reporting mechanism

Debt rescheduling

52. The Council has one loan from the Public Works Loan Board, repaid by fixed annuities over the life of the loan. As it would not be possible to prematurely repay the existing loan without incurring a premium charge for early settlement, there is currently no intention to redeem the loan early. The loans for the purchase of the Orchard Shopping Centre head lease will be repaid within 2 years and are at competitively low interest rates.

53. Any rescheduling will be reported to the Council at the earliest meeting following its action.

New financial institutions as a source of borrowing and / or types of borrowing

54. Following the decision by the PWLB on 9 October 2019 to increase their margin over gilt yields by 100 bps to 180 basis points on loans lent to local authorities, if any borrowing becomes necessary, consideration will also need to be given to sourcing funding at cheaper rates from the following:

    Local authorities (primarily shorter dated maturities)
    Financial institutions (primarily insurance companies and pension funds but also some banks, out of spot or forward dates)
    Municipal Bonds Agency

55. The degree which any of these options proves cheaper than PWLB Certainty Rate is still evolving at the time of writing but our advisors will keep us informed.

ANNUAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY

Investment policy – management of risk

56. The Council's investment policy has regard to the following: -

    - MHCLG's Guidance on Local Government Investments ("the Guidance")
    - CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes 2017 ("the Code")
    - CIPFA Treasury Management Guidance Notes 2018

57. The Council's investment priorities will be security first, portfolio liquidity second and then yield, (return).

58. The Head of Corporate Resources, under delegated powers, will undertake through the Shared Service Arrangement the most appropriate form of investments in keeping with the investment objectives, income and risk management requirements, and Prudential Indicators. As conditions in the financial markets remain uncertain, the proposed maximum limits for Specified and Unspecified Investments for 2020/21 are the same as for 2019/20.

59. Investment instruments identified for use in the financial year are listed in Appendices C and D under the 'specified' and 'non-specified' investments categories. Counterparty limits will be as set through the Council's treasury management practices.

60. The above guidance from the MHCLG and CIPFA place a high priority on the management of risk. This authority has adopted a prudent approach to managing risk and defines its risk appetite by the following means: -

    (i) Minimum acceptable credit criteria are applied in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties. This also enables diversification and thus avoidance of concentration risk. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the short term and long-term ratings.

    (ii) Other information: ratings will not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution; it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To achieve this consideration the Council will engage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as "credit default swaps" and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.

(iii) Other information sources used will include the financial press, share price and other such information pertaining to the financial sector in order to establish the most robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.

(iv) This authority has defined the list of types of investment instruments that the treasury management team is authorised to use. There are two lists in Appendices C and D under the categories of 'specified' and 'non-specified' investments.

- **Specified investments** are those with a high level of credit quality and subject to a maturity limit of one year.

- **Non-specified investments** are those with less high credit quality, may be for periods in excess of one year, and/or are more complex instruments which require greater consideration by members and officers before being authorised for use. Once an investment is classed as non-specified, it remains non-specified all the way through to maturity i.e. an 18 month deposit would still be non-specified even if it has only 11 months left until maturity.

(v) Lending limits, (amounts and maturity), for each counterparty are set out in Appendices C and D.

(vi) This authority will set a limit for the amount of its investments which are invested for longer than 365 days, (see paragraph 4.8).

(vii) Investments will only be placed with counterparties from countries with a specified minimum sovereign rating, (see paragraph 4.5). The UK is excluded from this limit because it will be necessary to invest in UK banks and other institutions even if the sovereign rating is cut.

(viii) Through the shared service, this authority has access to external consultants, to provide expert advice on how to optimise an appropriate balance of security, liquidity and yield, given the risk appetite of this authority in the context of the expected level of cash balances and need for liquidity throughout the year.

(ix) All investments will be denominated in sterling.

(x) As a result of the change in accounting standards for 2019/20 under IFRS 9, this authority will consider the implications of investment instruments which could result in an adverse movement in the value of the amount invested and resultant charges at the end of the year to the General Fund. (In November 2018, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, [MHCLG], concluded a consultation for a temporary override to allow English local authorities time to adjust their portfolio of all pooled investments by announcing a statutory override to delay implementation of IFRS 9 for five years commencing from 1.4.18. Consequently any fluctuations in the value of the Council's investment in the Local Authorities' Property Fund will not be taken through the general fund for the period of the override).

61. However, this authority will also pursue **value for money** in treasury management and will monitor the yield from investment income against appropriate benchmarks for investment performance, (see paragraph 4.14). Regular monitoring of investment performance will be carried out during the year.

Changes in risk management policy from last year

62. The above criteria are unchanged from last year other than as set out in the Summary at the beginning of the report.

Creditworthiness policy

63. The primary principle governing the Council's investment criteria through the Shared Services Arrangement (SSA) is the security of its investments, although the yield or return on the investment is also a key consideration. After this main principle, the SSA will ensure that:

- It maintains a policy covering both the categories of investment types it will invest in, criteria for choosing investment counterparties with adequate security, and monitoring their security. This is set out in the specified and non-specified investment sections in Appendices C and D; and

- It has sufficient liquidity in its investments. For this purpose it will set out procedures for determining the maximum periods for which funds may prudently be committed. These procedures also apply to the Council's Prudential Indicators covering the maximum principal sums invested.

64. The SSA will maintain a counterparty list in compliance with the criteria in the Appendices and will revise the criteria and submit them to Council for approval as necessary. These criteria are separate to that which determines which types of investment instrument are either specified or non-specified as it provides an overall pool of counterparties considered high quality which the Council may use, rather than defining what types of investment instruments are to be used.

65. Credit rating information is supplied to the SSA by Link Asset Services, our treasury advisors, on all active counterparties that comply with the criteria below. Any counterparty failing to meet the criteria would be omitted from the counterparty (dealing) list. Any rating changes, rating Watches (notification of a likely change), rating Outlooks (notification of the longer term bias outside the central rating view) are provided to the SSA almost immediately after they occur and this information is considered before dealing. For instance, a negative rating Watch applying to a counterparty at the minimum Council criteria will be suspended from use, with all others being reviewed in light of market conditions.

Use of additional information other than credit ratings

66. Additional requirements under the Code require the Council to supplement credit rating information. Whilst the above criteria rely primarily on the application of credit ratings to provide a pool of appropriate counterparties for officers to use, additional operational market information will be applied before making any specific investment decision from the agreed pool of counterparties. This additional market information will be applied to compare the relative security of differing investment opportunities.

67. The officers of the shared service recognise that ratings should not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution and that it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets, the government support for banks, and the credit ratings of that government support.Accordingly, the shared service will exercise discretion to deviate from Link's suggested durational bands – for example the Council approves the use of Building Societies as set out in the Appendices.

The Council's Minimum Investment Creditworthiness Criteria

68. The minimum credit ratings criteria used by the Council generally will be a short term rating (Fitch or equivalents) of F1, and long term rating A-. There may be occasions when the counterparty ratings from one or more of the three Ratings Agencies are marginally lower than the minimum requirements of F1 Short term, A- Long term (or equivalent). Where this arises, the counterparties to which the ratings apply may still be used with discretion, but in these instances consideration will be given to the whole range of topical market information available, not just ratings.

69. The Council includes **Building Societies** with asset size in excess of £1 billion in the specified investments. It is recognised that they may carry a lower credit rating than the Council's other counterparties, or no rating, therefore the lending limits for the building societies shall be £4m each for the top 3 and £3m for the others.

UK banks – ring fencing

70. The largest UK banks, (those with more than £25bn of retail / Small and Medium-sized Enterprise (SME) deposits), are required, by UK law, to separate core retail banking services from their investment and international banking activities by 1st January 2019. This is known as "ring-fencing". Whilst smaller banks with less than £25bn in deposits are exempt, they can choose to opt up. Several banks are very close to the threshold already and so may come into scope in the future regardless.

71. Ring-fencing is a regulatory initiative created in response to the global financial crisis. It mandates the separation of retail and SME deposits from investment banking, in order to improve the resilience and resolvability of banks by changing their structure. In general, simpler activities offered from within a ring-fenced bank, (RFB), will be focused on lower risk, day-to-day core transactions, whilst more complex and "riskier" activities are required to be housed in a separate entity, a non-ring-fenced bank, (NRFB). This is intended to ensure that an entity's core activities are not adversely affected by the acts or omissions of other members of its group.

72. While the structure of the banks included within this process may have changed, the fundamentals of credit assessment have not. The Council will continue to assess the new-formed entities in the same way that they do others and those with sufficiently high ratings, (and any other metrics considered), will be considered for investment purposes.

Country Limits and Proposed Monitoring Arrangements

73. Due care will be taken to consider the country, group and sector exposure of the Council's investments. The SSA has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from countries (other than the UK) with a minimum sovereign credit rating of AA- from Fitch Ratings (or equivalent from other agencies if Fitch does not provide one). The list of countries that qualify using these credit criteria as at the date of this report is reflected in the counterparty approved lending list shown at Appendix C. This list will be added to, or deducted from, by officers should ratings change, in accordance with this policy. No more than 25% of investments shall be placed in non-UK financial institutions for more than 7 days.

Investment strategy

74. **In-house funds** - Investments will be made with reference to the core balance and cash flow requirements and the outlook for short-term interest rates (i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months). Greater returns are usually obtainable by investing for longer periods. While most cash balances are required in order to manage the ups and downs of cash flow, where cash sums can be identified that could be invested for longer periods, the value to be obtained from longer term investments will be carefully assessed. For cash flow balances, the shared service will seek to use notice accounts, money market funds and short-dated deposits to benefit from the compounding of interest

- If it is thought that Bank Rate is likely to rise significantly within the time horizon being considered, then consideration will be given to keeping most investments as being short term or variable.

- Conversely, if it is thought that Bank Rate is likely to fall within that time period, consideration will be given to locking in higher rates currently obtainable, for longer periods.

75. The Head of Corporate Resources, through the shared service, will undertake the most appropriate form of investments in keeping with the investment objectives, income and risk management requirements and Prudential Indicators. Decisions taken on the core investment portfolio will be reported to the meetings of the Audit Committee and the Council in accordance with the reporting arrangements. The Council's shared service will research the range of "green" and "ethical" investments that is developing.

Investment returns expectations

76. On the assumption that the UK and EU agree a Brexit deal including the terms of trade by the end of 2020 or soon after, then Bank Rate is forecast to increase only slowly over the next few years, to reach 1.25% by quarter 1 2023. Bank Rate forecasts are:

Q1 2021	:	0.75%
Q1 2022	:	1.00%
Q1 2023	:	1.25%

77. The suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to about three months during each financial year are as follows:

2019/20	:	0.75%
2020/21	:	0.75%
2021/22	:	1.00%
2022/23	:	1.25%
2023/24	:	1.50%
2024/25	:	1.75%
Later years	:	2.25%

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is probably relatively even due to the weight of all the uncertainties over post-Brexit trade arrangements and the impact of an expansionary government spending policy (as expected in the Budget on the 11th March).

- The balance of risks to increases or decreases in Bank Rate and shorter term PWLB rates are also broadly even.

Funds available for investment

78. The application of resources (capital receipts, reserves etc.) to either finance capital expenditure or other budget decisions to support the revenue budget will have an ongoing impact on investments unless resources are supplemented each year from new sources (asset sales etc.). Detailed below are estimates of the year-end balances.

Investments	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate
	£m	£m	£m	£m
Balance at 1 April	31.152	31.000	39.895	48.182
Capital Expenditure	(6.253)	(2.232)	(1.989)	(0.161)
Grants, capital receipts & other new funds	2.365	13.127	15.276	11.298
Loan repayments/adjustments	3.736	(2.000)	(5.000)	0.000
Balance at 31 March	31.000	39.895	48.182	59.319

Investment treasury indicator and limit - principal funds invested for greater than 365 days

79. These limits are set with regard to the Council's liquidity requirements and to reduce the need for early sale of an investment, and are based on the availability of funds after each year-end.

80. The Council is asked to approve the treasury indicator limit: -

Maximum proportion of principal sums invested > 365 days	2020/21	2021/22	2022/23
Principal sums invested > 365 days	50%	50%	50%

81. In any sustained period of significant stress in the financial markets, the default position is for investments to be placed with The Debt Management Account Deposit Facility of the Debt Management Office (DMO) of the UK central government. The rates of interest are below equivalent money market rates, however, the returns are an acceptable trade-off for the guarantee that the Council's capital is secure.

82. The Council's proposed investment activity for placing cash deposits in 2019/20 will be to use:

- AAA-rated Money Market Funds with a Constant Net Asset Value (CNAV) or a Low Volatility Net Asset Value (LVNAV) under the new money market fund regulations
- other local authorities, parish councils etc.
- bank business reserve accounts and term deposits. These are primarily restricted to UK institutions that are rated at least A- long term.
- Building Societies with asset size in excess of £1 billion

Other Options for Longer Term Investments

83. To provide the Council with options to enhance returns above those available for short term durations, it is proposed to retain the option to use the following for longer term investments, as an alternative to cash deposits:

a) **Supranational bonds** greater than 1 year to maturity

b) **Gilt edged securities** with a maturity of greater than one year. These are Government bonds and so provide the highest security of interest and the repayment of principal on maturity. Similar to category (a) above, the value of the bond may rise or fall before maturity and losses may accrue if the bond is sold before maturity.

c) **Building Societies** not meeting the basic security requirements under the specified investments, but on the list in Appendix C (b). The operation of some building societies does not require a credit rating, although in every other respect the security of the society would match similarly sized societies with ratings.

d) Any **bank** that has a minimum long term credit rating of A- for deposits with a maturity of greater than one year (including forward deals in excess of one year from inception to repayment).

e) Any **non-rated subsidiary** of a credit rated institution included in the specified investment category. These institutions will be included as an investment category subject to a guarantee from the parent company, and exposure up to the limit applicable to the parent.

g) **Property Investment Funds** for example the Local Authorities' Property Fund. The Councils will consult the Treasury Management Advisors and undertake appropriate due diligence before investment of this type is undertaken. Some of these funds are deemed capital expenditure – the Councils will seek guidance on the status of any fund considered for investment.

h) Other **local authorities**, parish councils etc.

i) Other investments listed in Appendices C and D - the Council will seek further advice on the appropriateness and associated risks with investments in these other categories as and when an opportunity presents itself.

The **accounting treatment** may differ from the underlying cash transactions arising from investment decisions made by the Council. To ensure that the Council is protected from any adverse revenue impact, which may arise from these differences, the accounting implications of new transactions will be reviewed before they are undertaken.

The Council will not transact in any investment that may be deemed to constitute capital expenditure (e.g. Share Capital, or pooled investment funds other than Money Market Funds), without the resource implications being approved as part of the consideration of the Capital Programme or other appropriate Committee report.

Investment risk benchmarking – The shared service will subscribe to Link's Investment Benchmarking Club to review the investment performance and risk of the portfolios.

At the end of the financial year the Council will report on investment activity as part of the Annual Treasury Report.

External fund managers

The Council does not use external fund managers, but reserves the option to do so in future should this be deemed to be appropriate. Should consideration be given to exercising this option in the future, the relevant Committee will be advised of the reasons for doing so and the Council requested to consider whether it wishes to proceed with the selection and appointment of external fund managers.

The monitoring of investment counterparties – The credit rating of counterparties will be monitored regularly. The shared service receives credit rating information (changes, rating watches and rating outlooks) from Link Asset Services as and whent ratings change, and counterparties are checked promptly. On occasion ratings may be downgraded when an investment has already

been made. The criteria used are such that a minor downgrading should not affect the full receipt of the principal and interest. Any counterparty failing to meet the criteria will be removed from the list immediately by the shared service, and if required, new counterparties which meet the criteria will be added to the list.

Officers of the shared service met in January with representatives of the Local Authorities' Property Fund for a presentation on the activity and outlook of the Fund to supplement the regular reports and dividend statements.

Appendix A

THE CAPITAL PRUDENTIAL AND TREASURY INDICATORS 2020/21 – 2022/23

1.1 The Council's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The output of the capital expenditure plans is reflected in the Prudential Indicators, which are designed to assist Members' overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

Capital expenditure	2018/19 Actual	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate
	£m	**£m**	**£m**	**£m**	**£m**
General Fund	24.626	6.253	2.232	1.989	0.161

1.2 **Affordability Prudential Indicators**

The previous sections cover the overall capital and control of borrowing Prudential Indicators, but within this framework Prudential Indicators are required to assess the affordability of the capital investment plans. These provide an indication of the impact of the capital investment plans on the Council's overall finances. The Council is asked to approve the following indicators:

Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream

This indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital (borrowing and other long term obligation costs net of investment income) against the net revenue stream.

	2018/19 Actual	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate
	%	**%**	**%**	**%**	**%**
Ratio	0.50%	0.58%	0.39%	-1.04%	-3.07%

The estimates of financing costs include current commitments and the proposals in this budget report.

1.3 **Maturity structure of borrowing**

These gross limits are set to reduce the Council's exposure to large fixed rate sums falling due for refinancing, and are required for upper and lower limits. However as the Council currently has only two significant loans, the upper limits need to be set very high. The Council does not have any variable rate borrowing.

The Council is asked to approve the following treasury indicators and limits:

Maturity structure of fixed interest rate borrowing 2020/21		
	Lower	**Upper**
Under 12 months	0%	50%
12 months to 2 years	0%	70%
2 years to 5 years	0%	80%
5 years to 10 years	0%	80%
Over 10 years	0%	60%

Appendix B

TREASURY MANAGEMENT PRACTICE (TMP1) – CREDIT AND COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT

The MHCLG issued Investment Guidance in 2018, and this forms the structure of the Council's policy below. These guidelines do not apply to either trust funds or pension funds which operate under a different regulatory regime.

The key intention of the Guidance is to maintain the current requirement for councils to invest prudently, and that priority is given to security and liquidity before yield. In order to facilitate this objective the guidance requires this Council to have regard to the CIPFA publication Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice and Cross-Sectoral Guidance Notes, which will apply to all investment activity. In accordance with the Code, the Council will comply with the treasury management practices (TMPs). This part, TMP 1(1), covering investment counterparty policy requires approval each year.

Annual investment strategy - The key requirements of both the Code and the investment guidance are to set an annual investment strategy, as part of the annual treasury strategy for the following year, covering the identification and approval of the following:

- The strategy guidelines for choosing and placing investments, particularly non-specified investments.
- The principles to be used to determine the maximum periods for which funds can be committed.
- Specified investments that the Council will use. These are high security (i.e. high credit rating, although this is defined by the Council, and no guidelines are given), and high liquidity investments in sterling and with a maturity of no more than a year.
- Non-specified investments, clarifying the greater risk implications, identifying the general types of investment that may be used and a limit to the overall amount of various categories that can be held at any time.

Strategy guidelines – The main strategy guidelines are contained in the body of the treasury strategy statement.

SPECIFIED AND NON SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS

Specified Investments will be those that meet the criteria in the MHCLG Guidance, i.e. the investment

- is sterling denominated

- has a maximum maturity of 1 year or where the Council has the right to be repaid within 12 months

- meets the "high" credit criteria as determined by the Council or is made with the UK government or is made with a local authority in England, Wales and Scotland.

- the making of which is not defined as capital expenditure under section 25(1)(d) in SI 2003 No 3146 (i.e. the investment is not loan capital or share capital in a body corporate).

These are considered low risk assets where the possibility of loss of principal or investment income is small.

"Specified" Investments identified for the Council's use are:

- The UK Government such as the Debt Management Account deposit facility
- Deposits with UK local authorities
- Deposits with banks and building societies
- *Certificates of deposit with banks and building societies
- *Gilts : (bonds issued by the UK government)
- *Bonds issued by multilateral development banks
- Pooled investment vehicles such as AAA Money Market Funds with a Constant Net Asset Value (Constant NAV) or appropriate Low Volatility Net Asset Value (LVNAV) that have been awarded an AAA rating by Standard and Poor's, Moody's and/or Fitch rating agencies.
- Other Money Market Funds and Collective Investment Schemes– i.e. credit rated funds which meet the definition of a collective investment scheme as defined in SI 2004 No 534 and SI 2007 No 573.

* Investments in these instruments will be on advice from the Shared Service's treasury advisor.

For credit rated counterparties, the minimum criteria, excepting for the Council's own banker and the specified building societies, (see below) will be the short-term / long-term ratings assigned by various agencies which may include Moody's Investors Services, Standard and Poor's, Fitch Ratings, being:

Long-term investments (over 365 days): minimum: A- (Fitch) or equivalent
Or
Short-term investments (365 days or less): minimum: F1 (Fitch) or equivalent

For all investments the Shared Service will also take into account information on corporate developments of, and market sentiment towards, investment counterparties.

If the Council's own banker (currently Lloyds Bank) falls beneath the specified criteria, it will still be used for transactional purposes.

Within these bodies, and in accordance with the Code, the Council has set additional criteria to set the time and amount of monies which will be invested in these bodies, as detailed below.

APPENDIX C

APPROVED INVESTMENT INSTITUTIONS

Specified Investments identified for use by the Council

New specified investments will be made within the following limits:

(a) Banks

Major U.K. and European Banks and their wholly-owned subsidiaries meeting the Council's approved investment criteria. RFB refers to Ring Fenced Bank – the separate core retail banking service.

	Counterparty	Group	Maximum Sum	Maximum Period *
1	HSBC UK Bank PLC (RFB)	N/A	£4m	5 years
2	The Royal Bank of Scotland Group:	£5m		
	The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC (RFB)		£4m	5 years
	National Westminster Bank PLC (RFB)		£4m	5 years
3	Lloyds Group::	£5m		
	Lloyds Bank PLC (RFB)		£4m	5 years
	Bank of Scotland PLC (RFB)		£4m	5 years
4	Barclays Bank UK PLC (RFB)	N/A	£4m	5 years
5	Santander UK PLC	N/A	£4m	5 years
6	Clydesdale Bank PLC	N/A	£4m	5 years
7	Handelsbanken PLC	N/A	£4m	1 year
8	Goldman Sachs International Bank	N/A	£4m	5 years
9	Close Brothers Ltd	N/A	£4m	5 years

*Specified investments are for a maximum period of 1 year, the maximum limits shown in this column are for non-specified investments with these institutions.

(b) Building Societies

Building Societies (Assets in excess of £1 billion):

Rank	Name of Counterparty	Individual	
		Sum	Period*
1	Nationwide	£4m	3 years
2	Coventry	£4m	3 years
3	Yorkshire	£4m	3 years
4	Skipton	£3m	3 years
5	Leeds	£3m	3 years
6	Principality	£3m	3 years
7	West Bromwich	£3m	3 years
8	Nottingham	£3m	3 years
9	Newcastle	£3m	3 years
10	Cumberland	£3m	3 years
11	National Counties	£3m	3 years
12	Progressive	£3m	3 years
13	Cambridge	£3m	3 years
14	Newbury	£3m	3 years
15	Monmouthshire	£3m	3 years
16	Leek United	£3m	3 years
17	Saffron	£3m	3 years

*Specified investments are for a maximum period of 1 year, the maximum limits shown in this column are for non-specified investments with these institutions.

(c) Money Market Funds

Counterparty	Sum	
Invesco Aim – Sterling	£3m	For Short Term Operational Cash Flow Purposes
Blackrock Institutional Sterling Liquidity Fund	£3m	
Goldman Sachs Sterling Liquidity Reserve Fund	£3m	
Fidelity Institutional Cash Fund plc – Sterling	£3m	
CCLA Public Sector Deposit Fund	£3m	
JP Morgan GBP Liquidity LVNAV Fund	£3m	
Federated Short-Term Sterling Prime Liquidity Fund	£3m	

The limit for investing in any one Money Market Fund is £3 million. Total investments in Money Market Funds shall not exceed the higher of £9m or 25% of the total investment portfolio, for more than one week at any one time.

(d) Local Authorities

All the following local authorities mentioned in the Regulations

Schedule Part II Ref	Details	Individual	
		Sum	Period*
1	County Councils (England and Wales)	£3m	5 years
2	District Councils in England and Wales (including Borough, City, Metropolitan Borough Councils and Unitary Councils)	£3m	5 years
3	London Borough Councils	£3m	5 years
4	The Common Council of the City of London	£3m	5 years
5	The Council for the Isles of Scilly	£3m	5 years
7	Combined Police Authorities	£3m	5 years
16	Regional, Islands, or District Councils in Scotland	£3m	5 years
17	Joint boards under s.235 (1) of LG (Scotland) Act 1973	£3m	5 years
28	District Councils in Northern Ireland	£3m	5 years
29	Police Authorities (now Police and Crime Commissioners) under s.3 Police Act 1964 as substituted by s.2 Police & Magistrates Courts Act 1994	£3m	5 years

*Specified investments are for a maximum period of 1 year, the maximum limits shown in this column are for non-specified investments with these institutions.

APPENDIX D

NON-SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS DETERMINED FOR USE BY THE COUNCIL

Having considered the rationale and risk associated with Non-Specified Investments, the following have been determined for the Council's use.

	In-house use	Use by Fund Managers	Maximum Maturity	Maximum % of portfolio or £m	Capital Expenditure?
• Deposits with banks and building societies and Local Authorities • Certificates of deposit with banks and building societies	√ √	 √	5 years	The higher of £10m or 50% of funds	No
Gilts and Bonds: • Gilts • Bonds issued by multilateral development banks • Bonds issued by financial institutions guaranteed by the UK government • Sterling denominated bonds by non-UK sovereign governments	√ √ √ √ (on advice from treasury advisor)	√ √ √ √	5 years	The higher of £3m or 25% of funds	No
Money Market Funds and Collective Investment Schemes (pooled funds which meet the definition of a collective investment scheme as defined in SI 2004 No. 534 and SI 2007, No. 573), but which are not credit rated.	√ (on advice from treasury advisor)	√	These funds do not have a defined maturity date.	The higher of £9m or 25% of funds	No
Government guaranteed bonds and debt instruments (e.g. floating rate notes) issued by corporate bodies	√ (on advice from treasury advisor)	√	5 years	The higher of £2m or 10% of funds	Subject to test
Property Funds approved by HM Treasury and operated by managers regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority – specifically the Local Authorities' Property Fund	√	√	These funds do not have a defined maturity date.	The higher of £6m or 25% of funds	No
Non-guaranteed bonds and debt instruments (e.g. floating rate notes) issued by corporate bodies	√ (on advice from treasury advisor)	√	5 years	The higher of £2m or 10% of funds	Subject to test
Collective Investment Schemes (pooled funds) which do not meet the definition of collective investment schemes in SI 2004 No. 534 or SI 2007, No. 573.	√ (on advice from treasury advisor)	√	These funds do not have a defined maturity date	The higher of £2m or 20% of funds	Subject to test

In determining the period to maturity of an investment, the investment is regarded as commencing on the date of the commitment of the investment rather than the date on which funds are paid over to the counterparty.

The Council will seek further advice on the appropriateness and associated risks with investments in these categories.

Accounting treatment of investments

The accounting treatment may differ from the underlying cash transactions arising from investment decisions made by this Council. To ensure that the Council is protected from any adverse revenue impact, which may arise from these differences, we will review the accounting implications of new transactions before they are undertaken.

APPENDIX E

TREASURY MANAGEMENT SCHEME OF DELEGATION

(i) **Full Council**

- approval of annual treasury management strategy and Annual Investment Strategy
- approval of MRP Statement
- approval of/amendments to the organisation's adopted clauses, treasury management policy statement and treasury management practices
- budget consideration and approval
- approval of the division of responsibilities

(ii) **Audit Committee**

Receiving and reviewing the following, and making recommendations to the Cabinet

- regular monitoring reports on compliance with the Treasury Management Strategy, practices and procedures.
- receiving and reviewing regular monitoring reports and acting on recommendations

(iii) **The S151 (responsible) officer**

- recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance
- submitting regular treasury management policy reports
- submitting budgets and budget variations
- receiving and reviewing management information reports
- reviewing the performance of the treasury management function
- ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function
- ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit
- approving the selection of external service providers and agreeing terms of appointment.

APPENDIX F

ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

UK. Brexit. 2019 was a year of upheaval on the political front as Theresa May resigned as Prime Minister to be replaced by Boris Johnson on a platform of the UK leaving the EU on 31 October 2019, with or without a deal. However, MPs blocked leaving on that date and the EU agreed an extension to 31 January 2020. In late October, MPs approved an outline of a Brexit deal to enable the UK to leave the EU on 31 January. The Conservative Government gained a large overall majority in the **general election** on 12 December; this ensured that the UK left the EU on 31 January. However, there will still be much uncertainty as the detail of a comprehensive trade deal will need to be negotiated by the current end of the transition period in December 2020, which the Prime Minister has pledged he will not extend. This could prove to be an unrealistically short timetable for such major negotiations that leaves open three possibilities; a partial agreement on many areas of agreement and then continuing negotiations to deal with the residual areas, the need for the target date to be put back, probably two years, or, a no deal Brexit in December 2020.

GDP growth took a big hit from both political and Brexit uncertainty during 2019; quarter three 2019 surprised on the upside by coming in at +0.4% q/q, +1.1% y/y. However, the peak of Brexit uncertainty during the final quarter appears to have suppressed quarterly growth to probably around zero. The forward-looking surveys in January have indicated that there could be a significant recovery of growth now that much uncertainty has gone. Nevertheless, economic growth may only come in at about 1% in 2020, pending the outcome of negotiations on a trade deal. Provided there is a satisfactory resolution of those negotiations, which are in both the EU's and UK's interest, then growth should strengthen further in 2021.

At its 30 January meeting, the Monetary Policy Committee held Bank Rate unchanged at 0.75%. The vote was again split 7-2, with two votes for a cut to 0.50%. The financial markets had been predicting a 50:50 chance of a rate cut at the time of the meeting. Admittedly, there had been plenty of downbeat UK economic news in December and January which showed that all the political uncertainty leading up to the general election, together with uncertainty over where Brexit would be going after the election, had depressed economic growth in quarter 4. In addition, three members of the MPC had made speeches in January which were distinctly on the dovish side, flagging up their concerns over weak growth and low inflation; as there were two other members of the MPC who voted for a rate cut in November, five would be a majority at the January MPC meeting if those three followed through on their concerns.

However, that downbeat news was backward looking; more recent economic statistics and forward-looking business surveys, have all pointed in the direction of a robust bounce in economic activity and a recovery of confidence after the decisive result of the general election removed political and immediate Brexit uncertainty. In addition, the September spending round increases in expenditure will start kicking in from April 2020, while the Budget in March is widely expected to include a substantial fiscal boost by further increases in expenditure, especially on infrastructure. The Bank of England cut its forecasts for growth from 1.2% to 0.8% for 2020, and from 1.8% to 1.4% for 2021. However, these forecasts could not include any allowance for the predicted fiscal boost in the March Budget. Overall, the MPC clearly decided to focus on the more recent forward-looking news than the earlier downbeat news.

The quarterly Monetary Policy Report did, though, flag up that there was still a risk of a Bank Rate cut; "Policy may need to reinforce the expected recovery in UK GDP growth should the more positive signals from recent indicators of global and domestic activity not be sustained or should indicators of domestic prices remain relatively weak." Obviously, if trade negotiations with the EU failed to make satisfactory progress, this could dampen confidence and growth. On the other hand, there was also a warning in the other direction, that if growth were to pick up strongly, as suggested by recent business surveys, then "some modest tightening" of policy might be needed further ahead. It was therefore notable that the Bank had dropped its phrase that tightening would be "limited and gradual", a long-standing piece of forward guidance; this gives the MPC more room to raise Bank Rate more quickly if growth was to surge and, in turn, lead to a surge in inflation above the 2% target rate.

As for **inflation** itself, CPI has been hovering around the Bank of England's target of 2% during 2019, but fell again in both October and November to a three-year low of 1.5% and then even further to 1.3% in December. It is likely to remain close to or under 2% over the next two years and so, it does not pose any immediate concern to the MPC at the current time. However, if there was a hard or no deal Brexit, inflation could rise towards 4%, primarily because of imported inflation on the back of a weakening pound.

With regard to the **labour market,** growth in numbers employed has been quite resilient through 2019 until the three months to September, where it fell by 58,000. However, there was an encouraging pick up again in the three months to October to growth of 24,000 and then a stunning increase of 208,000 in the three months to November. The unemployment rate held steady at a 44-year low of 3.8% on the Independent Labour Organisation measure. Wage inflation has been steadily falling from a high point of 3.9% in July to 3.4% in November (3-month average regular pay, excluding bonuses). This meant that in real terms, (i.e. wage rates higher than CPI inflation), earnings grew by about 2.1%. As the UK economy is very much services sector driven, an increase in household spending power is likely to feed through into providing some support to the overall rate of economic growth in the coming months. The other message from the fall in wage growth is that employers are beginning to find it easier to hire suitable staff, indicating that supply pressure in the labour market is easing.

Coronavirus. The recent Coronavirus outbreak could cause disruption to the economies of affected nations. The Chinese economy is now very much bigger than it was at the time of the SARS outbreak in 2003 and far more integrated into world supply chains. However, a temporary dip in Chinese growth could lead to a catch up of lost production in following quarters with minimal net overall effect over a period of a year. However, no one knows quite how big an impact this virus will have around the world; hopefully, the efforts of the WHO and the Chinese authorities will ensure that the current level of infection does not multiply greatly.

USA. After growth of 2.9% y/y in 2018 fuelled by President Trump's massive easing of fiscal policy, growth has weakened in 2019. After a strong start in quarter 1 at 3.1%, (annualised rate), it fell to 2.0% in quarter 2 and then 2.1% in quarters 3 and 4. This left the rate for 2019 as a whole at 2.3%, a slowdown from 2018 but not the precursor of a recession which financial markets had been fearing earlier in the year. Forward indicators are currently indicating that growth is likely to strengthen somewhat moving forward into 2020.

The Fed finished its series of increases in rates to 2.25 – 2.50% in December 2018. In July 2019, it cut rates by 0.25% as a 'midterm adjustment'. It also ended its programme of quantitative tightening in August 2019, (reducing its holdings of treasuries etc.). It then cut rates by 0.25% again in September and by another 0.25% in its October meeting to 1.50 – 1.75%. It left rates unchanged at its December meeting. Rates were again left unchanged at its end of January meeting although it had been thought that as the yield curve on Treasuries had been close to inverting again, (with 10 year yields nearly falling below 2 year yields - this is often viewed as being a potential indicator of impending recession), that the Fed could have cut rates, especially in view of the threat posed by the coronavirus. However, it acknowledged that coronavirus was a threat of economic disruption but was not serious at the current time for the USA. In addition, the phase 1 trade deal with China is supportive of growth. The Fed though, does have an issue that despite reasonably strong growth rates, its inflation rate has stubbornly refused to rise to its preferred core inflation target of 2%; it came in at 1.6% in December. It is therefore unlikely to be raising rates in the near term. It is also committed to reviewing its approach to monetary policy by midyear 2020; this may include a move to inflation targeting becoming an average figure of 2% so as to allow more flexibility for inflation to under and over shoot.

"The NEW NORMAL." The Fed chairman has given an overview of the current big picture of the economy by summing it up as **A NEW NORMAL OF LOW INTEREST RATES, LOW INFLATION AND PROBABLY LOWER GROWTH.** This is indeed an affliction that has mired Japan for the last two decades despite strenuous efforts to stimulate growth and inflation by copious amounts of fiscal stimulus and cutting rates to zero. China and the EU are currently facing the same difficulty to trying to get inflation and growth up. Our own MPC may well have growing concerns and one MPC member specifically warned on the potential for a low inflation trap in January.

It is also worth noting that no less than a quarter of total world sovereign debt is now yielding negative returns.

EUROZONE. Growth has been slowing from +1.8 % during 2018 to nearly half of that in 2019. Growth was +0.4% q/q in quarter 1, +0.2% q/q in quarters 2 and 3; it then fell to +0.1% in quarter 4 for a total overall growth rate of only 1.0% in 2019. Recovery from quarter 4 is expected to be slow and gradual. German GDP growth has been struggling to stay in positive territory in 2019 and grew by only 0.6% in 2019, with quarter 4 potentially being a negative number. Germany would be particularly vulnerable to a no deal Brexit depressing exports further and if President Trump imposes tariffs on EU produced cars.

The European Central Bank (ECB) ended its programme of quantitative easing purchases of debt in December 2018, which then meant that the central banks in the US, UK and EU had all ended the phase of post financial crisis expansion of liquidity supporting world financial markets by quantitative easing purchases of debt. However, the downturn in EZ growth in the second half of 2018 and in 2019, together with inflation falling well under the upper limit of its target range of 0 to 2%, (but it aims to keep it near to 2%), has prompted the ECB to take new measures to stimulate growth. At its March 2019 meeting, it said that it expected to leave interest rates at their present levels "at least through to the end of 2019", but that was of little help to boosting growth in the near term. Consequently, it announced a **third round of TLTROs**; this provides banks with cheap borrowing every three months from September 2019 until March 2021 that means that, although they would have only a two-year maturity, the Bank was making funds available until 2023, two years later than under its previous policy. As with the last round, the new TLTROs will include an incentive to encourage bank lending, and they will be capped at 30% of a bank's eligible loans. However, since then, the downturn in EZ and world growth has gathered momentum; at its meeting on 12 September, it cut its deposit rate further into negative territory, from -0.4% to -0.5%, and announced a **resumption of quantitative easing purchases of debt for an unlimited period.** At its October meeting it said these purchases would start in November at €20bn per month - a relatively small amount compared to the previous buying programme. It also increased the maturity of the third round of TLTROs from two to three years. However, it is doubtful whether this loosening of monetary policy will have much impact on growth and, unsurprisingly, the ECB stated that governments would need to help stimulate growth by 'growth friendly' fiscal policy. There have been no changes in rates or monetary policy since October. In January, the ECB warned that the economic outlook was 'tilted to the downside' and repeated previous requests for governments to do more to stimulate growth by increasing national spending. The new President of the ECB, Christine Lagarde who took over in December, also stated that a year long review of monetary policy, including the price stability target, would be conducted by the ECB
On the political front, Austria, Spain and Italy have been in the throes of **forming coalition governments** with some unlikely combinations of parties i.e. this raises questions around their likely endurance. The most recent results of German state elections has put further pressure on the frail German CDU/SDP coalition government and on the current leadership of the CDU.

CHINA. Economic growth has been weakening over successive years, despite repeated rounds of central bank stimulus; medium term risks are increasing. Major progress still needs to be made to eliminate excess industrial capacity and the stock of unsold property, and to address the level of non-performing loans in the banking and shadow banking systems. In addition, there still needs to be a greater switch from investment in industrial capacity, property construction and infrastructure to consumer goods production.

JAPAN - has been struggling to stimulate consistent significant GDP growth and to get inflation up to its target of 2%, despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus. It is also making little progress on fundamental reform of the economy.

WORLD GROWTH. Until recent years, world growth has been boosted by increasing **globalisation** i.e. countries specialising in producing goods and commodities in which they have an economic advantage and which they then trade with the rest of the world. This has boosted worldwide productivity and growth, and, by lowering costs, has also depressed inflation. However, the rise of China as an economic superpower over the last thirty years, which now accounts for nearly 20% of

total world GDP, has unbalanced the world economy. The Chinese government has targeted achieving major world positions in specific key sectors and products, especially high tech areas and production of rare earth minerals used in high tech products. It is achieving this by massive financial support, (i.e. subsidies), to state owned firms, government directions to other firms, technology theft, restrictions on market access by foreign firms and informal targets for the domestic market share of Chinese producers in the selected sectors. This is regarded as being unfair competition that is putting western firms at an unfair disadvantage or even putting some out of business. It is also regarded with suspicion on the political front as China is an authoritarian country that is not averse to using economic and military power for political advantage. The current trade war between the US and China therefore needs to be seen against that backdrop. It is, therefore, likely that we are heading into a period where there will be a **reversal of world globalisation and a decoupling of western countries** from dependence on China to supply products. This is likely to produce a backdrop in the coming years of weak global growth and so weak inflation. **Central banks are, therefore, likely to come under more pressure to support growth by looser monetary policy measures and this will militate against central banks increasing interest rates**.

The trade war between the US and China is a major concern to **financial markets** due to the synchronised general weakening of growth in the major economies of the world, compounded by fears that there could even be a recession looming up in the US, though this is probably overblown. These concerns resulted in **government bond yields** in the developed world falling significantly during 2019. If there were a major worldwide downturn in growth, central banks in most of the major economies will have limited ammunition available, in terms of monetary policy measures, when rates are already very low in most countries, (apart from the US). There are also concerns about how much distortion of financial markets has already occurred with the current levels of quantitative easing purchases of debt by central banks and the use of negative central bank rates in some countries.

INTEREST RATE FORECASTS

The interest rate forecasts provided by Link Asset Services in paragraph 3.3 are **predicated on an assumption of an agreement being reached on Brexit between the UK and the EU.** On this basis, while GDP growth is likely to be subdued in 2019 and 2020 due to all the uncertainties around Brexit depressing consumer and business confidence, an agreement on the detailed terms of a trade deal is likely to lead to a boost to the rate of growth in subsequent years. This could, in turn, increase inflationary pressures in the economy and so cause the Bank of England to resume a series of gentle increases in Bank Rate. Just how fast, and how far, those increases will occur and rise to, will be data dependent. The forecasts in this report assume a modest recovery in the rate and timing of stronger growth and in the corresponding response by the Bank in raising rates.

- In the event of an **orderly non-agreement exit in December 2020**, it is likely that the Bank of England would take action to cut Bank Rate from 0.75% in order to help economic growth deal with the adverse effects of this situation. This is also likely to cause short to medium term gilt yields to fall.
- If there were a **disorderly Brexit**, then any cut in Bank Rate would be likely to last for a longer period and also depress short and medium gilt yields correspondingly. Quantitative easing could also be restarted by the Bank of England. It is also possible that the government could act to protect economic growth by implementing fiscal stimulus.

The balance of risks to the UK

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is probably relatively even due to the weight of all the uncertainties over post-Brexit trade arrangements and the impact of an expansionary government spending policy (as expected in the Budget on 11th March).
- The balance of risks to increases or decreases in Bank Rate and shorter term PWLB rates are also broadly even.

One risk that is both an upside and downside risk, is that all central banks are now working in very different economic conditions than before the 2008 financial crash as there has been a major increase in consumer and other debt due to the exceptionally low levels of borrowing rates that have prevailed since 2008. This means that the neutral rate of interest in an economy, (i.e. the rate that is neither expansionary nor deflationary), is difficult to determine definitively in this new environment, although central banks have made statements that they expect it to be much lower than before 2008. Central banks could therefore either over or under do increases in central interest rates.

Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:

- **Post Brexit trade negotiations** – if it were to cause significant economic disruption and a major downturn in the rate of growth.
- **Bank of England** takes action too quickly, or too far, over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.
- A resurgence of the **Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.** In 2018, Italy was a major concern due to having a populist coalition government which made a lot of anti-austerity and anti-EU noise. However, in September 2019 there was a major change in the coalition governing Italy which has brought to power a much more EU friendly government; this has eased the pressure on Italian bonds. Only time will tell whether this new coalition based on an unlikely alliance of two very different parties will endure.
- Weak capitalisation of some **European banks**, particularly Italian banks.
- **German minority government.** In the German general election of September 2017, Angela Merkel's CDU party was left in a vulnerable minority position dependent on the fractious support of the SPD party, as a result of the rise in popularity of the anti-immigration AfD party. The CDU has done badly in recent state elections but the SPD has done particularly badly and this has raised a major question mark over continuing to support the CDU. Angela Merkel has stepped down from being the CDU party leader but she intends to remain as Chancellor until 2021.
- **Other minority EU governments.** Austria, Finland, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands and Belgium also have vulnerable minority governments dependent on coalitions which could prove fragile.
- **Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary** now form a strongly anti-immigration bloc within the EU. There has also been rising anti-immigration sentiment in Germany and France.
- In October 2019, the IMF issued a report on the World Economic Outlook which flagged up a synchronised slowdown in world growth. However, it also flagged up that there was **potential for a rerun of the 2008 financial crisis**, but his time centred on the huge debt binge accumulated by corporations during the decade of low interest rates. This now means that there are corporates who would be unable to cover basic interest costs on **some $19trn of corporate debt in major western economies,** if world growth was to dip further than just a minor cooling. This debt is mainly held by the shadow banking sector i.e. pension funds, insurers, hedge funds, asset managers etc., who, when there is $15trn of corporate and government debt now yielding negative interest rates, have been searching for higher returns in riskier assets. Much of this debt is only marginally above investment grade so any rating downgrade could force some holders into a fire sale, which would then depress prices further and so set off a spiral down. The IMF's answer is to suggest imposing higher capital charges on lending to corporates and for central banks to regulate the investment operations of the shadow banking sector. In October 2019, the deputy Governor of the Bank of England also flagged up the dangers of banks and the shadow banking sector lending to corporates, especially highly leveraged corporates, which had risen back up to near pre-2008 levels.
- **Geopolitical risks,** for example in North Korea, but also in Europe and the Middle East, which could lead to increasing safe haven flows.

Upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates

- **Brexit** – if a comprehensive agreement on a trade deal was reached that removed all threats of economic and political disruption between the EU and the UK.
- The **Bank of England is too slow** in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflationary pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a later rapid series of increases in Bank Rate faster than we currently expect.
- **UK inflation,** whether domestically generated or imported, returning to sustained significantly higher levels causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.